

Masao Maruyama and Imaginative Geography of the Nation*

Sang-Jung KANG**

(Translated by Takashi YAMAZAKI***)

Introduction: Masao Maruyama, why now?

I would like to talk about Masao Maruyama rather than a thesis of space today and to address two topics about his thought since it is related to the subject of space. First, there are significant differences and similarities over the meaning of space among those who argue about it from their own perspectives. Some define it as a methodological concept and others as a substance at the meta-narrative level. Second, there is a need to evaluate in what direction something vernacular or local is moving in the actual context of globalization. In these respects, my talk will have something to do with the subject of space.

My current work is to analyze the construction of discourses or media on China and Korea in the early periods of Japanese modernization in the Meiji era and the Establishment press published by Koreans and Chinese living in Japan in the total-war period of the 1930s. In this sense, Masao Maruyama is a secondary topic for my current work though I do not want to neglect him. However, I have been interested in him and decided to conclude my research on him within this year. So, I would like to talk about one of my three interests, Maruyama. Because my talk has not been completely elaborated and includes many contradictions and discrepancies, you may ask what I

want to say.

Although little time has elapsed since Masao Maruyama passed away, he ranks with Ryotaro Shiba who was a national novelist and also passed away recently. I am very interested in both of them because of this coincidence, and consequently discovered a minor theme to reinterpret the twentieth century Japan through Masao Maruyama. Although the central theme here is space, time or historicity is a companion to space. How space is related to time or historicity in the place of Japan and whether a category of Japan itself is a *propri* self-evident are also included in this re-interpretation of twentieth century Japan in spite of the ambitiousness of the theme. I have chosen Masao Maruyama for this purpose.

Before I begin, I would like to explain the overall framework for my current research. First, I would like to consider state reason and the nation, and nation-building or -poiesis, which is a modified version of what I published in "*Reki-shigaku kenkyu*" (historical research)¹. I will talk about state reason later. Second, I am going to talk about the imaginative geography of the nation which I believe has something to do with geography and space. Third, I would like to consider wars and politics in the twentieth century. To put it concretely, I would like to refer to Masao Maruyama and Weber who was the greatest social scientist in the twentieth century. Fourth, and finally, in terms of the nation and intellectuals, I have chosen Masao Maruyama and Shigeru Nambara who was Maruyama's teacher. According to these four components, I would like to consider ways to reexamine the history of Japan at the end of the twentieth century and at the demise of the

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** Institute of Socio-Information and Communication Studies, University of Tokyo, kan@isics.u-tokyo.ac.jp

*** Department of Geography, Colorado University, Ph.D. student, yamazakt@ucsub.colorado.edu

postwar period.

Maruyama and the state of Meiji

Today's talk falls into one of the before-mentioned components. What I would like to address is the reason why Masao Maruyama becomes problematic in terms of the subject of space, which is clear to me but not necessarily to you. Maruyama, in fact, wrote many reviews on Yukichi Fukuzawa beginning during the second world war until the time he passed away. I personally believe that the thoughts of Yukichi Fukuzawa and Masao Maruyama represent typical intellectual discourses in prewar and postwar Japan respectively. I think examining these two intellectuals can clarify the modernity of Japan lasting through the war as problematic.

In one of his reviews on Fukuzawa, Maruyama argues that a certain society in a certain period of time has its own discipline typical to the time and society and that the discipline in prewar Japan was established by Yukichi Fukuzawa. I think that the equivalent to it in the discursive space of postwar Japan is represented by Masao Maruyama, though this categorization is too academic. This is the reason I have chosen him.

Before I came here, a newspaper company asked me to watch the movie entitled "Pride". As I watched the movie, I could not help thinking of the issue of history and the nation. Why do it become an issue now? A group of cohesive people called nation, a geographical representation as a basis for the nation, a national land to sustain the nation, and a history or narrative for telling the history which is imprinted in the nation are discussed when the twentieth century comes to a dead end. A movie such as this is made when the postwar period is allegedly over. Issues over national history and narrative are being debated in the fields of social sciences, thoughts, and philosophy. When I consider these issues, Masao Maruyama gives me great insight into these issues.

There is another key person, Ryotaro Shiba, who we should examine in considering these issues. Popular novels have been read and loved by an astronomical number of people ever since the

prewar period. They still maintain deep-rooted popularity through visual media such as the *Nippon Hoso Kyokai* (NHK). I think the nationwide popularity and influence of Ryotaro Shiba as well as Maruyama has a symbolic meaning in this sense.

Although I wanted to think of these two intellectuals as key players, I would like to make Shiba a byplayer and talk mainly about Maruyama. If I dare to draw a clear line between the prewar and postwar periods on August 15, 1945, I can hypothetically argue that Maruyama's idea shifted from history to space across the line. Today I would like to talk about why the shift happened and what it implies. Both Maruyama and Shiba ascribe one of the origins of postwar Japan to the Meiji era. Exactly speaking, they ascribe it to the state of Meiji, not to the era of Meiji. While Maruyama published an article entitled '*Meiji kokka no seishin*' (the spirit of the state of Meiji)² in 1949, Shiba's posthumous manuscripts '*Showa toiu kokka*' (the state of Showa)³ were recently published by the NHK. Before this Shiba published '*Meiji toiu kokka*' (the state of Meiji)⁴, which became a best seller and has been reprinted so often that we cannot compete against his sales ability. Why were they obsessed by the state, especially by the state of Meiji?

Another aspect they share in common is the feeling towards the Showa era. Masao Maruyama developed his very radical and brilliant political analysis of the Fascist period of the Showa era and the era in general in one of his best sellers '*Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo*' (thought and behavior in modern Japanese politics)⁵ published first by *Miraisha*. Shiba's essays on the era have also been published as '*Showa toiu kokka*'. For both of them, I think, the era of Showa was limited to the wartime period from the 1930s to the early 1940s. It was the era which was very abnormal and completely deviated from the modernity of Japan. As you know, Maruyama went to Pyongyang, or *Heijo*, as a common soldier and was finally bombed at Ujina in Hiroshima Prefecture. Ryotaro Shiba also went to Nomohan as a common soldier of a tank corps. Although Maruyama was about ten years older than Shiba, they both had a similar experience of the war.

The eras of Meiji and Showa had their dark and bright sides. The postwar period of Showa

means to Maruyama and Shiba a return to the bright era of Meiji and gives them the impression of the Renaissance of the Meiji era. Although their backgrounds as an intellectual working in an imperial university and as a nationally popular novelist were different, they share so much in common that their perception of the postwar period of Showa seems to have become a national agreement and to have been established as a national narrative.

When I ask myself why it is like this, I realize that we usually accept the fact that since the Emperor's announcement of Japan's surrender and what Maruyama called 'the revolution of August 15', the period and space called postwar Japan have been separated from the prewar period and remained as such for more than fifty years. However, this seems to be a fiction which I have difficulty accepting.

As you know, in one of his articles Maruyama said that he expected the vacant fantasy of postwar democracy rather than the real existence of the Great Japanese Empire. 'The revolution of August 15' began with the Declaration of Humanizing the Emperor made by the Emperor Showa on January 1, 1946. The Declaration actually began with the Imperial Covenant of Five Articles given by the Emperor Meiji. Through these guidelines, the fanaticism of fascism in the Showa era and the military cliques and bureaucrats of the Ministry of the Interior who supported it were all ousted. Then the new Constitution was proclaimed after MacArthur's statement. As a result, the postwar democracy has been understood as the Renaissance of the Meiji era in the discursive space of postwar Japan. The Declaration by the Emperor Showa in fact manifested it. In this narrative, Masao Maruyama published his most famous article '*Chokokkashugi no ronri to shinri*' (the logic and psychology of ultra-nationalism) in "*Sekai*" (the world)⁶ and made his debut as an overwhelmingly influential intellectual in the discursive space of postwar Japan.

Although I cannot go into detail about this today because of limited time, between August 15 and MacArthur's statement Maruyama actually believed that it would not be necessary to abandon the Constitution of the Great Japanese Empire if it was partially modified. As far as I know, Maruyama believed that it might be possible to start the postwar period without modifying the

Emperor system if Tatsukichi Minobe's thesis of the Emperor as an institution was followed. After the Emperor died, Maruyama wrote in one of his reminiscences that he was in fact a liberal chief vassal for the Emperor. In this respect, in spite of the fact that he was one of the most liberal and radical intellectuals, he managed to undergo a Copernican change through the clearly external and heteronomous coercion of three principles of people's sovereignty, pacifism, and democracy. They were imposed on him by the General Headquarters as a super-constitutional force over the Emperor.

I wonder why he was like that. I presume that it was not until a series of events such as the Declaration by the Emperor Showa, MacArthur's statement, and the new Constitution of Japan were all present that the thesis of 'the revolution of August 15' was formulated in hindsight. Unfortunately, or as a matter of course, postwar Japan was able to change itself as a result of the collaboration of the power standing over the Constitution of the Great Japanese Empire, or over the power to write a constitution in Schmittian words, and the people enforcing the Constitution. It was not until the course of postwar Japan was determined that Masao Maruyama was able to emerge as a leading intellectual and critic in postwar Japan.

Individual and the nation during the war

Meanwhile, I began to get interested in what kind of discourse Maruyama held during the war. He wrote a very interesting article in the *Midori-kai* journal⁷ published by the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo in the 1930s. He argues that fascism is a child of European civil society though it does not resemble its parent, that a European type of civil society therefore cannot oppose Japanese militarism, and that a civil society will ultimately turn into a Fascist state in a period of crisis since a civil society essentially takes the form of an authoritative state. Maruyama claims that it is necessary to create a completely new state regime for Japan and uses the word of 'new dialectic totality' in this context.

Maruyama laid his hope on the new regime led by Fumimaro Konoe in 1940, one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor and soon after the out-

break of the Japan-China war. The movement for this new regime included intellectuals such as professors in the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo, Kiyoshi Miki, and Hidemi Ozaki. Maruyama stated in one of his essays that he laid his hope on this movement for the new regime. He thought it necessary to completely eliminate vernacularism from Japan in order to win the total war in the 1940s. He thought it impossible to create a new state for the total war without eliminating patriotic parochialism, local intermediate organizations and a sense of belonging to them, and a sense of primary community, or simply, a sense of *Gemeinschaft*. In this new state, he argued, individuals and the state could constitute dialectic totality.

I believe something cast a dark shadow on Maruyama's thought as well as on his later experience during the war. He had a sense of crisis in which Japanese nationalism could not build up a war regime as in Europe, nor could the total-war regime work as a whole because of very local, or vernacular, senses and interests in Japan. Maruyama thought a more modern nation-state should be created so as to be different from the totalitarian state in the Fascist period. In '*Fukuzawa Yukichi*'⁸ he states clearly that individual independence leads to state independence and that free and autonomous individuals and state totality constitute, or provide a vision of, dialectic totality without contradiction.

Let me use a different analogy. Maruyama believed that the *aporia* in the modern Japanese state was the separation of individual and national consciousness, or of individuality and totality, and that the emancipation of subject, or subjective internality in his words, and nationalism were actually both sides of the same coin. In this kind of modernization, or in a modern society such as this, nationalism cannot help taking a distorted form. Maruyama's major concern was how to overcome it.

In this sense, Maruyama regarded the war period as a perfect opportunity to create the total-war regime. He thought that the years between the 1930s and the early 1940s in that regime could be an epoch-making period to end vernacular consciousness, elemental parochialism, familistic consciousness, or local decentralized interests which had sustained nationalism since the Meiji

era. This idea represented his sympathy with Kono's new regime.

With an understanding of such an intention, it would be easier to read his '*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*' (a study on the history of Japanese political thoughts)⁹. What Maruyama tried to do in his three difficult articles in this book is what I have mentioned so far, that is, to trace individual consciousness back to Sorai Ogyu in the Edo period. He attempted to discover individual consciousness indigenous to Japan and its systematic channel leading to a nation as 'We' through external impacts. He demonstrated it well in '*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*' borrowing the discourses of several thinkers. On the other hand, Maruyama reviewed Fukuzawa, too. From my point of view, he shared fairly common discourses on the relationship between Japan and China with Kiyoshi Miki and Hidemi Ozaki who participated in *Showa Kenkyukai* (the Showa Study Group) though he emphatically denied it after the war.

The biggest problem for Japan in the 1930s to the early 1940s was *shina mondai* (China problem). When the way to create *toa shin chitsujo* (the new order of East Asia) became the biggest problem, Maruyama appeared to have thought that Japan should construct modern national consciousness through the before-mentioned total-war regime earlier than the rest of East Asia. This meant that the creation of the modern nation should be done by political resolution and not by nationalism in a cultural sense. We know examples of the latter as reviews of the Japanese and Japanese culture after the war. In Maruyama's words, the nation tries to become the nation, meaning the nation is created through an important resolution. Maruyama meant to create the will of the nation through democracy. He envisaged that as soon as Japan created its nation in the total-war regime it would support Chinese nationalism and build up a close connection with China through modern national consciousness. *Toa shin chitsujo* could finally be created on this relationship.

This is exactly what Miki thought. What Kiyoshi Miki considered in his many essays around 1940 is not Japanese consciousness which is known today through reviews of the Japanese or is sustained by local patriotism, but clearly national consciousness in a political sense for which

he continued to argue. Maruyama also believed that without national consciousness in a political sense China and Japan, having different cultural backgrounds, could never build up a connection in East Asia. This connection was based not on cultural but on political commonality. Focusing on this idea, he attempted to overcome crises in the 1930s and 40s. I interpret this as Maruyama's basic study on the history of thoughts during the war.

However, after the war his study started changing drastically. I would like to turn to the subject of space by referring briefly to the reason for the change. As you know, Maruyama contributed a bibliographical introduction to the fifth volume of *Heibonsha's* complete works of Koji Iizuka¹⁰, who was one of the most famous economic or human geographers. He states in the introduction that he had a prejudice towards Iizuka's major field, economic geography, since he had already been influenced by the Marxist thesis of developmental stages and that he rejected it all the more strongly due to the atmosphere of those days that was full of territorial concepts such as *daitoa* (great East Asia) and gross land. He also writes that he was drafted as a common soldier on July 1, 1944 and went to the corps at *Heijo*, currently Pyongyang, in Korea. As a result Maruyama had no opportunities to exchange intimate words with Iizuka in the field of Eastern culture as far as he remembered.

Maruyama always had in mind an idea of history rather than of space. His idea was above all a thesis of linear and single-track developmental stages. In this sense, Maruyama always thought of a sequential order between Japan and China which can be called typical modernism.

From history to space: The change of Maruyama after the war

However, Maruyama's idea was gradually changing. It is interesting to know his most famous and best masterpiece "*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*" was written to rival Iwano Koyama's "*Sekaiishi no tetsugaku*" (philosophy of the world history)¹¹. It was the most famous work in the Kyoto School which was prevail the thesis of '*Kindai no chokoku*' (overcoming modernity). It seems Maruyama felt himself as a rival of Tetsuo

Watsuji as well. Iwano Koyama's "*Sekaiishi no tetsugaku*" was published by *Iwanami Shoten* in 1942 and included a very important chapter entitled '*Rekishishi no kukansei to kukan no rekishisei*' (spatiality of history and historicity of space).

In this chapter, Iwano Koyama describes how the world history can diverge from European history into histories and uses Japan as a counterpart to depict world history as histories. To use Japan as a counterpart, he refers to the spatial particularity of Japan in the world. In order to do this, he writes an ambitious chapter '*Rekishishi no kukansei to kukan no rekishisei*' and proposes, already at this level, a new regime as a mediator between history and space.

When Koyama launched the '*kindai no chokoku*' thesis, he had already talked discussed the spatiality of history and historicity of space. Maruyama always had a sense of difference towards the issue of space. Michel Foucault mentions that while those who talk about space are reactionary, those who talk about history are progressive. In one of his essays Maruyama also expressed the same view. Since Maruyama was a typical young Marxist, he put more importance on history than on space.

However, when the war was over, Japan lost all of its colonies and returned to the early territory of the nation-state in the Meiji era. Japan decreased to that size through the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. As I mentioned at the beginning of this talk, Maruyama came to believe that Japan returned to some period in the Meiji era. In other words, he thought that Japan developed from a pure form of the nation-state to create a new colonial space of the empire beyond the nation-state and was externally forced to decrease in size to the early nation-state through the defeat. He believed the early nation-state to be an authentic form of Japan, meaning that the discursive space of postwar Japan returned to the Meiji era. I believe that Maruyama concluded that the colonial space was a deviant, very transitional, and temporary phenomenon. Considering Japan in this scenario, he questioned whether it might be impossible to measure Japan's particularity with a modern scale. He started gradually looking for a key to Japan's particularity by referring to space, by thinking what spatial location Japan occupied, and by clarifying Japan's geo-cultural, *Geokulturlich*, geographical or geopolitical position in

Wallerstein's terms.

In 1981 Maruyama gave a series of lectures at a university. The lectures were included in his collected lectures entitled '*Genkei, koso, shitsuyo teion*' (prototype, old layer, and persistent underlying tone)¹². He stated in the lectures that in the field of political science *Geopolitik* such as Haushofer's emphasized geographical position and climate, that *Geopolitik* had disappeared from academic circles because it was used by the Nazis. In addition, he stated that Carl Schmitt applied the same perspective to his thesis in his famous "*Daichi no nomosu*" (the *nomos* of the earth)¹³ and fought alone after the war though he was a war criminal. Although Maruyama refused to entirely accept *Geopolitik* or a perspective such as Schmitt's "*Daichi no nomosu*", he argued how the geographical, geopolitical or geo-cultural position of Japan had biased and convoluted Japanese culture or the prototype of temporal or historical consciousness inherent in Japan. This is mentioned in his famous article '*Rekishi ishiki no koso*' (the old layer of historical consciousness)¹⁴.

Apparently, Maruyama began to suspect that modernization as an eternal revolution would have more contradictions through the rapid economic growth after the 1960s. He suspected it would not become positive so easily. He seemed to understand that space did not bring about the linear progress of history as he had thought during the war, but particularity which always interrupted and biased the progress. This understanding began to emerge in his thought in the 1950s or near the end of the 1940s. As shown in his reviews of Yukichi Fukuzawa, '*Kindai nihon shisoshi ni okeru kokka risei no mondai*' (the subject of state reason in the history of modern Japanese thoughts)¹⁵, '*Meiji kokka no setshin*', '*Kaikoku*' (opening the state)¹⁶, or '*Rekishi ishiki no koso*', the subject of space inherent in Japan continued to be in his thought. In his simple words, his tone of emphasis on the history of thoughts was shifting from a vertical to a horizontal axis, or from history to space.

Iwao Koyama compares Japan, Polynesia, the Korea Peninsula, and China in the famous part of his '*Rekishi no kukansei to kukan no rekishisei*'. His question is in what kind of place a new civilization is created as a result of the migration of older one. He argues it is at the spatial position of

the Japan Islands that a place to create an inherent and historically new civilization can be found. His philosophical arguments show that Japan is an original *topos* completely different from the Pacific Islands such as Melanesia and Polynesia, a peninsula such as the Korea Peninsula, and the China Continent.

Maruyama makes exactly the same comparison as Koyama in '*Genkei, koso, shitsuyo teion*' though it is not clear whether Maruyama read Koyama's article. I cannot specify what Maruyama actually says since I do not have his article with me. Maruyama understands that the reason why the modernization of Asia was not realized in the Pacific Islands or island states but only in Japan can be explained through geographical, geopolitical, or geo-cultural comparison.

As I read it, I realized Maruyama said exactly the same thing as Koyama whom he most criticized. I believe Maruyama as well as Koyama probably read Watsuji's works very carefully. What Watsuji wants to say in his thesis of climate can be understood by reading his review of China. Maruyama extracts an archetype of something particular in Japan as '*tsugi tsugi ni nariyuku ikioi*' (continuous reproduction of driving force) from the mythological periods described in "*Kojiki*" (the records of old affairs) and "*Nihon shoki*" (the national history of Japan). In '*Rekishi ishiki no koso*', he demonstrates well how particularity in Japan has continued to exist as a persistent underlying tone from the ancient to the modern and contemporary periods. He concretely explains that one of the major factors to sustain this mechanism is the spatial position, or *topos*, of Japan.

I think that this discourse overlaps in many ways with the particularistic interpretation of Japan and reviews of Japanese culture and the Japanese in postwar Japan. Like "*Bunmei toshitenno ie shakai*" (the family-oriented society as a civilization)¹⁷ published in the 1970s, this is a kind of argument in which Japan is regarded as permanently self-evident and in which the spatial particularity of Japan's *topos* is related to an archetype of Japanese historical consciousness and is compared with Asia and Europe.

A limit of Maruyama's political science

In the end, Maruyama's postwar thesis on Japan shifted in the before-mentioned direction. From Maruyama's point of view, I wonder if he himself contributed to discourses creating the objects he had to criticize though his basic motivation was to critically oppose particularity emerging in the old layer of Japanese historical consciousness. I assume that he regarded Japan as self-evident and believed that its nation, its geographical representations, or its fundamental culture to create them maintained unbroken continuity. I wonder if he unconsciously repeated this rather modern discourse on Japan again.

Although Maruyama, in this respect, was the most modern intellectual, he was unconsciously affected by this meta-narrative discourse when he shifted to a spatial perspective. When we talk about Japan it necessary for us to critically reconstruct this meta-narrative discourse in a more historical context again. Otherwise, Maruyama's discourses over Japan would be absorbed in the ideological understanding of Japan. I personally believe that his position in his last years was almost on the edge of the absorption.

Masao Maruyama had thoroughly read German *Geopolitik* during the war and understood in his own way Watsuji's thesis on climate and Kyoto School's discourses over history and space. However, his major interest during the war was in how to build a modern nation. He believed that Japan was spontaneously producing relatively advanced elements of modernization in underdeveloped Asia or in the stagnant East. His vision was that Japan could take the lead in building a modernized nation and build up a closer connection with China.

However, the subject of space which had interested him less began to emerge clearly in his thought when he talked about Japan after the postwar rupture with China. This type of discourse can be found at the beginning of the Meiji era. Aritomo Yamagata proposed an argument at the first imperial assembly in 1890. His imaginative geography was represented by the boundaries of interests and sovereignty and was related to Imperial Japan. Imaginative geography such as this was expressed in domestic and international politics. Although Maruyama briefly mentioned this in '*Kindai nihon shisoshi ni okeru kokka riset no mondai*', he stopped critically reconstructing a priori aspects of the nation again by contextual-

izing them historically.

He states, for example, that what allows the Japanese and Japanese culture to exist is a historically profound principle. He explains the principle by stating that compared to other civilized countries, Japan has established an exceptionally homogenous society in terms of territory, nation, language, the mode of producing wet-field rice, and the form of settlements and festivals related to this mode. In addition, he states that Japan has maintained its society over a thousand years since the late Tumulus era.

As he mentions in '*Rekishi ishiki no koso*', he assumes at the meta-narrative level that Japan, the Japanese, or Japanese ethnicity are very solid. He does not perceive geographical frontiers forming Japan. Therefore, he does not see how Okinawa or Ryukyu, Hokkaido, and vernacularity within Japan have been reconstructed, hidden, or oppressed in the process of nation-building.

When we now think of the academic national narratives of Masao Maruyama as well as Ryotaro Shiba and reconstruct them historically, it is almost impossible to find in Maruyama's academic works the answers to the following questions. How did the nation absorb, transform, and assimilate differences within it or on the edge of its frontier? How was diversity or incommensurability absorbed into the nation before homogeneity was formed within it? What kind of heterogeneity did the empire meet when it expanded outward? What kind of cultural encounter did it achieve? Although the national territory and its imaginative geography has decreased to the size of current Japan following the demise of the empire, how is the encounter still applied to or alive in historical memories or other places within Japan?

In this sense, the political science of Masao Maruyama is typically that of nationalism. There are positive aspects and limits in his political science. When nationalism is being dissolved, I try to rediscover what discourses concerning the nation or nationalism have not yet been presented at both levels of history and space. I believe this work will provide historical materials in terms of considering how to outline a state, a supra-state or regional entity, and a sub-state or regional entity in a global era.

Beyond Maruyama

One of Maruyama's students, Taichiro Mitani, studies political history and holds a different perspective of him. Summarizing a hundred years of modern Japan, Mitani argues that these years were history made up of wartime regimes and postwar regimes, that Japanese democracy consisted fundamentally of postwar democracies, and, therefore, that all the regimes after the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War were postwar democracies. We now think of current postwar democracy as the last democracy fifty years after the war.

However, it is clear that this history would not have existed without the revolutionary changes of the wartime regime though this mobilization regime was the period of the world war at the end of the 1930s. This is also the history of the constant spatial expansion of Japan's frontiers enclosing colonies. Postwar democracy is often a period which addresses the issue of postcolonialism. In the fourth postwar democracy, this issue was addressed for the first time though it was virtually frozen for the following fifty years. This effect of the Cold War can be explained from a historical and spatial point of view. After the frozen fifty years, the Cold War came to the end and thawed. The blind spots, which were overlooked in the discussion about the nation in the space-time of the Cold War, began to emerge. From this perspective, it is no wonder that the limits of Maruyama can be seen after the Cold War.

While the space-time expressed in terms of the nation is becoming obsolete, a global aspect and a local aspect confront and mix each other. I would also like to consider a regional aspect regarding this subject which may be what Maruyama could not understand. As Mitani says, colonization was in fact a violent form of regionalism. This regionalism was established only through the formation of the empire. In our time, three tiers of globalization, localization, and regionalization affect the space-time of the nation-state and compete with each other. In this respect, the issues of postcolonialism, the empire, the nation, and locality are intricately related to each other and raised before us. I believe discourses such as Maruyama's are not sufficient to grasp these issues.

Discussions

Questioner: I am Yamazaki from Yamaguchi Prefectural University. My major is political geography. As you mentioned, political geography was involved in geopolitics during the war. This has created the atmosphere in geography as well as in political geography where scholars do not talk about politics. Although this was also seen in Europe and America, the recovery in Japan has been delayed. In spite of the fact that a research meeting of political geographers was held yesterday in the geographical conference, only I came here today. The reason I am here is because I knew you are presenting. Ever since reading your article on imaginative geography citing Said in "Shiso" (thoughts), I also believe that no geographer has as excellent a geographical sense as you do. I have been following you in the media through discussion programs on TV and I am glad to have heard your stimulating talk today. However I am discouraged by the current situation in which geographers have not critically overcome the discourses by Watsuji and Koji Iizuka setting Maruyama aside.

Though my questions may not be related to what I just said, I have two. One concerns what you mentioned at the beginning and is written in the back of your handout. You talked about making a political, not cultural, resolution on more modern national consciousness. I would like you to elaborate a little bit more about this political resolution. The other question is related to what you mentioned near the end of your talk. As you said, Maruyama was searching for an image of Japan growing out of Asian stagnation with the intention of building a modern nation before the war. I am, however, wondering why Maruyama continued to internalize the afterimage after the war, or why he restored his discourses by regarding the topos of Japan as self-evident even after the war. Is this simply the afterimage from wartime, or were there any factors in the postwar period which made Maruyama maintain his discourses? I would appreciate hearing your opinions on these two points.

Kang: Thank you very much. I am not yet very clear about them, either. I would like to answer

the second question first though it might be very personal comment. A book entitled "*Nihon no shiso*" (thoughts in Japan) was recently translated in Korea by Jong-Sopp Choi, a famous political scientist of Ko-Ryu University. He commented on his translation in the *Han-Gyul* newspaper. Although he admired Masao Maruyama very much on one hand, he mentioned on the other that Maruyama's discourses on Asia were hard to be found. I agree with him. For me, it is very hard to understand his position on Asia from his reputation and writings, too.

This is probably not the matter of theory. As you know, Maruyama served in the war for a second time at Ujina near the end of the war. He was affected by the atomic bombing there and given a *hibakusha techo* (a notebook for medical records given to a victim of radiation sickness caused by the atomic bomb: translator) when he went to Hiroshima though he later refused to accept it. He tried not to talk about his history as a victim of the atomic bombing. In addition, the General Staff Office of Japan was located at Ujina at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. The Emperor Meiji, though he was said to have had relatively peaceful ideas, moved the Office to Ujina and stayed there in military uniform. Maruyama was there, too. This is a symbolic story.

I believe his father, Kanji Maruyama, had a great deal of influential on him. As you know, Masao Maruyama was born in Osaka. Osaka was under the strong influence of the Asahi newspaper. Kanji was a famous journalist and active as a journalist in the Korea Peninsula during wartime. In addition, Kanji had close relationships with other famous journalists, Sanzan Ikebe and above all Nyozekean Hasegawa. Masao also had a very close relationship with Nyozekean. Masao's first place for his military service was Pyongyang and he stayed there for three months. It seems very strange to me that he did not record anything in his diaries or other writings during that period. Although he must have had detailed information about the situation in the Peninsula from Kanji Maruyama, he mentioned very little about it. There was an absence during this period which I do not understand very well.

I believe Marxist developmental theory had a strong influence on him in the 1930s. He was quite affected by Wittfogel who wrote about Oriental despotism. It was not until Wittfogel made

Herbert Norman the object of an attack by McCarthyism that Maruyama began to criticize Wittfogel and his idea of Oriental despotism. I assume that at the levels of his personality and theory, Maruyama deeply internalized this way of thinking.

Although I have not yet begun this, I think it will be necessary to examine the relationships of journalists and men of letters with China and Korea in the future. When I read Nyozekean's "*London! London?*" in *Iwanami* Paperbacks, I realized that there were clearly Orientalistic discourses on China at the end of his book. Even Nyozekean as a liberalist wrote this. When Soseki Natsume stopped over at South East Asia before going to London, he was cheated when he bought a souvenir. He got very angry and wrote down what he said in his diary. It says people without their countries are vulgar. He wrote that those who were colonized and lost their countries were mentally vulgar while he knew well how miserable he felt when being treated like a dwarf due to his size in Europe. I think Maruyama may have had this type of complex, too.

Although I do not intend to make fun of Maruyama, there is an interesting story I would like to share. As I mentioned before, when he met Iizuka for the first time, he wrote that he had never met such a handsome Hollywood-movie-star-like man as Iizuka and that he kept staring at his profile. He also wrote that his father, Kanji, would say to him, "Masao, you are lucky to be born as a man" and that the fact that he was not handsome became his strong complex. He compared himself with Koji Iizuka as a 'modern boy' who looked like a handsome Hollywood movie star after the 1920s.

The following may sound silly but it is a famous story about Soseki. When Soseki went to London and looked for someone shorter than him, he eventually someone that turned out to be his own reflection in the mirror. In terms of this, I wonder what the Korea Peninsula looked like to Maruyama. Soldiers' letters or writings on the Sino-Japanese War which I have read offer the image that sanitary conditions were very bad and that it was much dirtier than they had heard. Nyozekean described the same way in "*London! London?*" As Soseki write in his essay of "*Man Kan tokoro dokoro*" (travel essay in Manchuria and Korea), his first comment was that it was

dirty. Most people say the same thing as their physical impression. In Riichi Yokomitsu's "Shanghai" on labor disputes in 1925, the concession of Shanghai was strongly expressed as the image of dirtiness.

Based on this physical impression, simplistic theses on developmental stages of Asia were supported in the 1930s. I argue that this tendency was especially strong in Marxism and that it continued to exist in a different form in Maruyama's thought even after the war. Later it appeared in his geo-political and geo-cultural comparison between Japan and Asia. As Said says, it is true that Orientalism is a comparative study. I believe that Orientalism appears as comparison with different forms in Otsuka's comparative economic history or Maruyama's idea of comparative political culture. Therefore, it would be necessary to examine what was changed and what was not changed in intellectuals' discourses and thoughts during the time before and after the war. This is my tentative answer to one of your questions.

The answer to your first question regarding to 'revolutionism' might be very hard to understand. For example, Kiyoshi Miki said exactly the same thing as Maruyama in his essays and speeches in the 1930s and 40s. When he went to Manchuria, he emphasized *gozoku kyowa*. This means the co-operation of the five nations and is similar to the current EU as a principle. Though more than 90% of the population there were Chinese, the Japanese were domineering over other nations. They arrogantly believed Japanese culture was superior, rudely expressed Japanese parochialism, and formed their own groups at the exclusion of others. Miki believed these conditions would hinder the cooperation of the five nations and argued that the nation should be modern.

His position is similar to Maruyama's and both resemble the concept of 'nation' after the French Revolution. This meaning of nation states that the nation is formed through a resolution to become a French national, not through racial, ethnic, or cultural background. As long as the nation is defined that way, the concept is different from *Nation* in Germany. I believe this is along the lines of Jacobinist nationality. Enlightenmentist or Jacobinist nationality such as this consistently existed in Maruyama's thought. Without this nationality, it would have been impossible to engage

the cooperation of communities from different racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds. This was without doubt the idea that East Asia should be joined together against the imperialism of the great powers over Asia.

In "Yabe nikki" (Yabe's diary) written by Teiji Yabe, one of Maruyama's advisors, Yabe wrote that he screamed "Banzai!" (cheers!) on December 8, 1941 when he heard about the attack on Pearl Harbor. He wrote he was exceedingly glad. I believe that Yabe's reaction was common to most of the academicians of imperial universities at that time and that Maruyama was no exception at all.

For Maruyama, there was a space of politics as a principle needed to overcome cultural, ethnic, and local differences. The space of politics was designed for the resolution to do this. Maruyama thought the nation could not be defined by culture or language. He understood the nation as a memorized or imagined community. Although the *ethnie* of the Japanese does exist as an ethnic basis for the community, it is still a cultural nation. In order to become a modern nation in a political sense, the problems of democracy and nationalism have to be solved. In this sense, Maruyama tried to revive a nation-state of Japan in the trinity of political revolutionism, democracy, and a nation. He believed that China, which could not form nationalism because of its internal sectionalism, should form Sun-Wenian nationalism under the influence of Japan as a revived nation and that both countries should establish a new order of East Asia as equal partners. I believe this is a kind of regionalism.

Maruyama actually referred to Sun Wen very often in the 1940s. In this sense, his resolutionist conception of a nation, as I mentioned just now, implies that politics appears as a common space beyond cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences and that individuals make a resolution to become a nation spontaneously through democratic principles such as a referendum. As a result a new regime as well as a government and politics representing it is created. I believe this regime was Konoe's new regime for Maruyama.

Yamazaki: Thank you very much. I understand most of what you said. I wanted to hear your answers before making one more comment. Alt-

though they are the ideas of the same person, there is a contradiction between resolution as a political community and Japan as *topos* in which Maruyama was caught after the war. While I am encouraged by your speech, I am discouraged to hear Maruyama was like this. Although Maruyama as an intellectual representing Japan argued the establishment of democracy and a political community, he could not overcome his limit at the personal level. I feel this implies very difficult problems for the future society. This is just a comment. Thank you very much.

Kang: I think so, too. I think there are significant contradictions. I suppose this was caused mainly by the dismantling of the empire. The textbook in geography used in *kokumin gakko* (national elementary schools) around 1937 explained that the Great Japanese Empire consisted of the Japan Islands and the Korean Peninsula and that 70% of the total population were Japanese and 30% were people in overseas colonies. Children going to *kokumin gakko* at that time had the fundamental assumption that the state of Japan consisted of the Islands and the Peninsula as its core areas. I think it is necessary to read Maruyama's narratives on the nation in the context of the dismantling of the empire. As Benedict Anderson says, if the tight skin of a nation is stretched outward in the form of an empire, the nation may necessarily encounter something different and its skin may be torn. Therefore, the empire always retains the possibility that the pure homogeneity of its nation is sometimes infringed upon and made hybrid. These issues were absorbed again within the tight skin of the nation when the empire was dismantled. The part which was not absorbed still remains as postcolonial issues such as Okinawa and Sakhalin.

Questioner: I am Hanada from the University of Tokyo. Before the war, Maruyama was critical of the idea of 'historicity of space' or 'spatiality of history'. In this case, Maruyama depended on an axis of history. However, you said his axis shifted from history to space after the war. It is true that he used spatial arrangement as a metaphor for his postwar analysis in his debut article '*Chokokkashugi no ronri to shinri*'. It is said that he wrote the draft of his article right after the war when he was in the suburb of Hiroshima. I remember that

he paid attention to space around that time. Why, then, did he put an importance on history when his country was an empire and shift it onto space after the empire was dismantled? How can it be explained?

Kang: It is a hard question. I don't understand it well, either. Judging from the postscripts of the Japanese and English versions of "*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*"¹³, it seems that he realized something was missing after he finished the book. It seems that he felt the same way while writing about how modern thoughts were extracted from the establishment discipline of *shushigaku* (a near modern scholarly sect of Confucianism: translator) and from the process of dismantling the orthodox ideology. Although Maruyama did not clearly refer to it as space, it seems that the idea he started theorizing about in the 1950s after the war had already emerged in his mind when he wrote the last article in "*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*" in 1944. However, I think he had not yet clarified it as a form of space, as a horizontal axis to open the country as opposed to a vertical axis, or as 'cultural encounter' in his words. After he finished the article, Maruyama realized it was not that modern consciousness lacked in Japan but that it flew there like underground water. He repeatedly argues in the book that it is not that Japan lacked spontaneity to move to modernization but that the spontaneity existed in the establishment's ideology as a category of thought.

As you know, the first article in "*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*" starts with an argument on Hegel. If I use Hegel's words, it is clearly Hegelian historical philosophy. As you know, in his "*Historical Philosophy*" Hegel states China is an empire of continuity without change. Although Maruyama considers comparison here, he does not yet systematically conduct a comparative study in "*Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*". Needless to say, Maruyama does not mention Korean *shushigaku* in the book at all. While his argument moved from the study of Chinese classical literature by Sorai Ogyu through that of Japanese classical literature by Norinaga Motoori to Jinsai Ito's work, it is likely that Maruyama thought about how different they were from Confucianism as China's established ideology or from the neo-Confucianism (Korean *shushigaku*) such as Toegye Lee's. When considering how these studies

created an ideology encroaching the establishment from within in the orthodoxy of the feudal regime, I believe, he realized that his questions could not help becoming spatial comparison. After he finished the book he may have wondered why only Japan could establish a national community which was different from China and Korea though this idea of national community is distorted compared to a nation as an *Idealtypus*. I think this question made Maruyama consider comparison which seems to have been one of his concerns.

Based on this concern, as you know, after the war Maruyama wrote about Katsunan Kuga who was active in the newspaper *Nihon*. He wrote that Japan finally returned to its authentic four Japan Islands. From there, he continued to think about what was original in Japanese modernity at the level of Asia. For example, though this is your specialty, Mr Hanada, Maruyama compared Goering in Germany and Japanese war criminals. I do not necessarily agree with him. In short, there are his famous arguments that while the Nazis had self-awareness as Fascists who experienced freedom and consciousness, the Japanese did not have free consciousness to take responsibility and that the Japanese war criminals, therefore, cried for their lives while Goering hung himself. Maruyama argues the reason the Nazis slaughtered Jews is that Fascism, emerging from the bottom and experiencing modern individual consciousness, regarded Jews as things, or a *Sache*. Compared to this, he concluded, Japan did not have even that. In this respect, Asian particularity is more clearly contrasted with an *Idealtypus* of European or modern thoughts. On the other hand, I believe, he always kept Japanese particularity in East Asia in his mind.

Hanada: Then, it became easier after the war to treat Japan as space since the empire was dismantled, decreased in size, and purified?

Kang: I would think so. This happened not only to Maruyama but also to Tadao Yamahara who I studied to a certain extent and to Shigeru Nanbara who I wrote about earlier. I think imaginative geography of the Japan Islands, or the nation, was profoundly imprinted in their minds. When the Cairo Declaration did not recognize the territory

of Japan lower than a particular north latitude, Okinawa was not included in Japan. I believe there was a broad national consensus that Okinawa and probably Sakhalin, could be separated from the inherent territory of Japan. I suppose reviews of Japanese culture as a comparative study was not so popular before the war as after the war. What do you think? It seems it is a rather postwar phenomenon that the media is so differentiated and reviews of the Japanese and Japanese culture flourishes so much. It is true that there were ideologists of Japanese nationalism such as Shigetaka Shiga and Katsunan Kuga but I think their ideologies were different from very ethnocentric cultural nationalism which is seen after the war. Therefore, as Mr. Hanada said, Japanese imaginative geography that Japan returned to its pure form and Japanese cultural purity may have stimulated comparison between Japan and others.

Questioner: I am Onjo from Kyushu University. I have just one question. There is a concept of transportation in the works of Yukichi Fukuzawa. I understand it had a significant meaning in his thought when worldwide flows beyond nations were emerging. Maruyama seems to argue about the nation without addressing transportation. What do you think about this difference?

Kang: That is what Mr. Yoshimi wrote about. About Fukuzawa's *minjo isshin* (the renewal of public affairs)?

Yoshimi: Yes, part of it.

Kang: Part of it. In Fukuzawa's idea of *minjo isshin*, the power of communication is in a word emphasized. He clearly understood transportation, communication, and the postage system were the powers of civilization. Fukuzawa was active around the 1870s and 80s when modern geography became connected to the state after the Franco-Prussian War. For Fukuzawa civilization meant the diversification of social communication and the exchange of diverse values of individuals through the communication. The progress of civilization meant to Fukuzawa that impartial political power and the interaction of diverse values in diverse social fields constructs a more plural soci-

ety. I think this is the 'human interaction' thesis in Maruyama's words. Fukuzawa and Maruyama both mention this. In Maruyama's words, this is the society where the mode of communication is diversified through spontaneous associations such as *Meirokusha* so that diverse values are shared.

However, Fukuzawa clearly states that the structure of a state is nationality. Civilization and the structure of a state basically make up a set. This is a basic condition even though the former ultimately goes beyond the latter. Maruyama also argues that modernity constructs an important political community of a nation and that social 'human interaction' among the people and their mode of communication are diversified in the community. For Maruyama, therefore, becoming a diversified and plural society is not contradictory to becoming an externally strong nation-state. For example, the idea of Pax Britannica or Pax Americana implies that an externally strong state can also be an internally weak society or state. Here the issue of the state as a community became important, which is based on the universal public law of the coincidence of a nation and a state.

This is illustrated well in the argument of *Staatsraeson* (state reason) in *Kindai nihon ni okeru kokka rissei no mondaï*. That a society becomes more diverse, I believe, is not contradictory to the idea that the society takes the political form of a nation-state and emerges as a strong state in the space of the international society. Fukuzawa, as well as Maruyama, believed the power of the state increased with the advance of civilization in society. As Foucault says, a state can become stronger by making use of domestic politics sustaining *Staatsraeson* or bio-power in any kind of field such as labor, reproduction, and education. I believe this was one of the fundamental assumptions used to sustain the idea of state reason in the modern state. Basically we have not yet formed a society which is not governed by the state in the modern society. Even though the nation-state is being relativized and very much weakened, we still depend on something established through the state. This issue, for Fukuzawa, is that a diversified society and a mode of communication and the idea of state reason complement each other like the head and tail of the same coin. For example, if we look at the democratic period in the Tai-sho era, we realize that the 1920s, the time when modernism was activated domestically, brought

about the severest society to the Korean Peninsula. While Americanism was very much advanced within the state in the 1920s, the severest colonial domination was carried out beyond its boundaries. This *aporia* cannot be solved by the ideas of Maruyama and Fukuzawa. Neither Maruyama nor Fukuzawa could believe that the enhancement of associational diversity and spontaneity would make it possible to transcend the communality of the state, though this may be possible in a future world. Maruyama writes in his "*Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu*" (to read "An Introduction to Civilizations")¹⁹ that this transcendency is impossible in the current situation.

I would prefer to examine how impurities and distortions, which were incommensurable between the frontiers of Japan and the nation within the Japan Islands, were historically disposed of in the process of homogeneous *Gleichschaltung* or standardization. Only by historically reconstructing, reexperiencing, and discovering how national history has been narrated through oppressing and hiding impurities and distortions, can we see the external colonies on the horizon of our thought. From this viewpoint, something invisible within the boundaries of the nation will become visible. I believe that without this process, we can hardly deal with the problematic of nationalism though this may not make an answer to your question.

Translator's notes

Book titles are indicated by " ". Article titles are indicated by ' '. Otherwise non-

Notes

- ¹ The problematique of state reason in the thought of Maruyama Masao, *Rekishigaku Kenkyu*, 701, 1997 (J).
- ² *Meiji kokka no seishin*, Iwanami shoten, 1949 (J).
- ³ *Showa to iu kokka*, NHK, 1998 (J).
- ⁴ *Meiji to iu kokka*, NHK, 1989 (J).
- ⁵ *Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo*, Miraisha, 1956, 57 (J).
- ⁶ *Sekai*, 5, 1946 (J).
- ⁷ The concept of state in the political science, *Midorikai Journal of Tokyo Imperial University*, 8, 1936 (J).
- ⁸ *Sekai rekishi jiten*, volume 16, Heibonsha, 1953 (J).
- ⁹ *Nihon seiji shisoshi kenkyu*, Tokyo daigaku shup-

- pankai, 1952 (J).
- ¹⁰ *Iizuka Koji tyosaku shu, volume 5*, Heibonsha, 1976 (J).
- ¹¹ *Sekaishi no tetsugaku*, Iwanami shoten, 1942 (J).
- ¹² Genkei, koso, shitsuyo teion, *Nihon bunka no kakureta katachi, Dojidai library, 84*, Iwanami Shoten, 1984 (J).
- ¹³ *Daichi no nomosu*, Fukumura shuppan, 1976 (J).
- ¹⁴ *Nihon no shiso, volume 6, rekishi shiso shu*, Chikuma shobo, 1972 (J).
- ¹⁵ *Tenbo*, 37, 1949 (J).
- ¹⁶ *Koza gendai rinri, volume 11, tenkanki no rinrishiso (nihon)*, Chikuma shobo, 1959 (J).
- ¹⁷ *Chuo koron sha*, 1979 (J).
- ¹⁸ *Studies in the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan*, Princeton, 1974.
- ¹⁹ *Iwanami shinsho*, 1986 (J).

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