

OSAKA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INFORMATICS




A Privacy-Preserving Selectively Disclosed eKYC System Using Merkle Tree and Zero-Knowledge Proofs


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I. Background Blockchain-based eKYC is capable of single authentication and SSI model for issuing Verifiable Credentials, the Holder keeps the sharing data among multiple organizations using Blockchain. credentials and submits them to the verifier. Organization eKYC Information Verification Organization 2 eKYC DID Verified Verification Verification Organization 3 **Documents** Verifier Issuer Blockchain Information Fig. 2 Blockchain-based SSI Fig. 1 Blockchain-based eKYC

II. Current Problems X Multiple verifications Holder University: OMU Gradies Ahmed Fig. 3 Disclosing All Information X Multiple verifications Holder Verifier X Disclose all credentials 1. Name: Ahmed 2. University: OMU 3. GPA: 4.0 4. Field: Informatics 5. Degree: PhD Fig. 3 Disclosing All Information



IV. System Overview



During this fellowship period 3 of articles have been published in top 5% to 10% journals including IEEE and others. More 2 articles are under review in top tire IEEE journals. I have been participated conferences too.

Some selected articles:

- o A Systematic Review on Blockchain-Enabled eKYC: Leveraging SSI and DID for Secure and Efficient Identity Verification; IEEE IoT Journal
- o Efficient Verifiable Credential Aggregation with Blockchain Anchoring and ZK-SNARKs; IEEE Access

For research collaboration: isti.ru.cse@gmail.com

V. ZKP Implications




Fig. 6 Zero Trust VC




Fig. 7 Present Zero Trust VC for Verification

In this Proof of Concept (PoC), we successfully implemented eKYC and zk-SNARKs. SSI is a well-established approach, but it is still not included in this PoC. Implementing selective disclosure using zk-SNARKs requires more computational cost to achieve higher privacy.

VI. zk-SNARKs Implementation




Fig. 8 zk-SNARKs Implementation for Sample Input

that the computed hash matches the expected hash

bool isValid = computed_hash == expected_hash;

// Return whether the proof is valid

return isValid;

mputed_hash = sha256(eKYC_info[0..8], eKYC_info[8..16]);

// Hash the user's eKYC information (preimage)

Approach of zk-SNARKs:

- ✓ Convert eKYC data into ASCII and pack into 16 chunks of 32-bit int (512 bits).
- ✓ Compute expected hash
- ✓ SHA-256 h= SHA-256(eKYC[0-7], eKYC[8-15],)
- ✓ isValid = computed hash = = expected hash;